90 lines
		
	
	
		
			3.9 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			ReStructuredText
		
	
	
	
	
	
			
		
		
	
	
			90 lines
		
	
	
		
			3.9 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			ReStructuredText
		
	
	
	
	
	
| .. _securitybugs:
 | |
| 
 | |
| Security bugs
 | |
| =============
 | |
| 
 | |
| Linux kernel developers take security very seriously.  As such, we'd
 | |
| like to know when a security bug is found so that it can be fixed and
 | |
| disclosed as quickly as possible.  Please report security bugs to the
 | |
| Linux kernel security team.
 | |
| 
 | |
| Contact
 | |
| -------
 | |
| 
 | |
| The Linux kernel security team can be contacted by email at
 | |
| <security@kernel.org>.  This is a private list of security officers
 | |
| who will help verify the bug report and develop and release a fix.
 | |
| If you already have a fix, please include it with your report, as
 | |
| that can speed up the process considerably.  It is possible that the
 | |
| security team will bring in extra help from area maintainers to
 | |
| understand and fix the security vulnerability.
 | |
| 
 | |
| As it is with any bug, the more information provided the easier it
 | |
| will be to diagnose and fix.  Please review the procedure outlined in
 | |
| admin-guide/reporting-bugs.rst if you are unclear about what
 | |
| information is helpful.  Any exploit code is very helpful and will not
 | |
| be released without consent from the reporter unless it has already been
 | |
| made public.
 | |
| 
 | |
| Disclosure and embargoed information
 | |
| ------------------------------------
 | |
| 
 | |
| The security list is not a disclosure channel.  For that, see Coordination
 | |
| below.
 | |
| 
 | |
| Once a robust fix has been developed, the release process starts.  Fixes
 | |
| for publicly known bugs are released immediately.
 | |
| 
 | |
| Although our preference is to release fixes for publicly undisclosed bugs
 | |
| as soon as they become available, this may be postponed at the request of
 | |
| the reporter or an affected party for up to 7 calendar days from the start
 | |
| of the release process, with an exceptional extension to 14 calendar days
 | |
| if it is agreed that the criticality of the bug requires more time.  The
 | |
| only valid reason for deferring the publication of a fix is to accommodate
 | |
| the logistics of QA and large scale rollouts which require release
 | |
| coordination.
 | |
| 
 | |
| Whilst embargoed information may be shared with trusted individuals in
 | |
| order to develop a fix, such information will not be published alongside
 | |
| the fix or on any other disclosure channel without the permission of the
 | |
| reporter.  This includes but is not limited to the original bug report
 | |
| and followup discussions (if any), exploits, CVE information or the
 | |
| identity of the reporter.
 | |
| 
 | |
| In other words our only interest is in getting bugs fixed.  All other
 | |
| information submitted to the security list and any followup discussions
 | |
| of the report are treated confidentially even after the embargo has been
 | |
| lifted, in perpetuity.
 | |
| 
 | |
| Coordination
 | |
| ------------
 | |
| 
 | |
| Fixes for sensitive bugs, such as those that might lead to privilege
 | |
| escalations, may need to be coordinated with the private
 | |
| <linux-distros@vs.openwall.org> mailing list so that distribution vendors
 | |
| are well prepared to issue a fixed kernel upon public disclosure of the
 | |
| upstream fix. Distros will need some time to test the proposed patch and
 | |
| will generally request at least a few days of embargo, and vendor update
 | |
| publication prefers to happen Tuesday through Thursday. When appropriate,
 | |
| the security team can assist with this coordination, or the reporter can
 | |
| include linux-distros from the start. In this case, remember to prefix
 | |
| the email Subject line with "[vs]" as described in the linux-distros wiki:
 | |
| <http://oss-security.openwall.org/wiki/mailing-lists/distros#how-to-use-the-lists>
 | |
| 
 | |
| CVE assignment
 | |
| --------------
 | |
| 
 | |
| The security team does not normally assign CVEs, nor do we require them
 | |
| for reports or fixes, as this can needlessly complicate the process and
 | |
| may delay the bug handling. If a reporter wishes to have a CVE identifier
 | |
| assigned ahead of public disclosure, they will need to contact the private
 | |
| linux-distros list, described above. When such a CVE identifier is known
 | |
| before a patch is provided, it is desirable to mention it in the commit
 | |
| message if the reporter agrees.
 | |
| 
 | |
| Non-disclosure agreements
 | |
| -------------------------
 | |
| 
 | |
| The Linux kernel security team is not a formal body and therefore unable
 | |
| to enter any non-disclosure agreements.
 | 
