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			159 lines
		
	
	
		
			6.4 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			ReStructuredText
		
	
	
	
	
	
| SCTP SELinux Support
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| =====================
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| 
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| Security Hooks
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| ===============
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| 
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| ``Documentation/security/LSM-sctp.rst`` describes the following SCTP security
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| hooks with the SELinux specifics expanded below::
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| 
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|     security_sctp_assoc_request()
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|     security_sctp_bind_connect()
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|     security_sctp_sk_clone()
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|     security_inet_conn_established()
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| 
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| 
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| security_sctp_assoc_request()
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| -----------------------------
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| Passes the ``@ep`` and ``@chunk->skb`` of the association INIT packet to the
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| security module. Returns 0 on success, error on failure.
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| ::
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| 
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|     @ep - pointer to sctp endpoint structure.
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|     @skb - pointer to skbuff of association packet.
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| 
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| The security module performs the following operations:
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|      IF this is the first association on ``@ep->base.sk``, then set the peer
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|      sid to that in ``@skb``. This will ensure there is only one peer sid
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|      assigned to ``@ep->base.sk`` that may support multiple associations.
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| 
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|      ELSE validate the ``@ep->base.sk peer_sid`` against the ``@skb peer sid``
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|      to determine whether the association should be allowed or denied.
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| 
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|      Set the sctp ``@ep sid`` to socket's sid (from ``ep->base.sk``) with
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|      MLS portion taken from ``@skb peer sid``. This will be used by SCTP
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|      TCP style sockets and peeled off connections as they cause a new socket
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|      to be generated.
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| 
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|      If IP security options are configured (CIPSO/CALIPSO), then the ip
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|      options are set on the socket.
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| 
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| 
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| security_sctp_bind_connect()
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| -----------------------------
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| Checks permissions required for ipv4/ipv6 addresses based on the ``@optname``
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| as follows::
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| 
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|   ------------------------------------------------------------------
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|   |                   BIND Permission Checks                       |
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|   |       @optname             |         @address contains         |
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|   |----------------------------|-----------------------------------|
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|   | SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD     | One or more ipv4 / ipv6 addresses |
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|   | SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR          | Single ipv4 or ipv6 address       |
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|   | SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR | Single ipv4 or ipv6 address       |
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|   ------------------------------------------------------------------
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| 
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|   ------------------------------------------------------------------
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|   |                 CONNECT Permission Checks                      |
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|   |       @optname             |         @address contains         |
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|   |----------------------------|-----------------------------------|
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|   | SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX      | One or more ipv4 / ipv6 addresses |
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|   | SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP          | One or more ipv4 / ipv6 addresses |
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|   | SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT       | Single ipv4 or ipv6 address       |
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|   | SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY     | Single ipv4 or ipv6 address       |
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|   ------------------------------------------------------------------
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| 
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| 
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| ``Documentation/security/LSM-sctp.rst`` gives a summary of the ``@optname``
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| entries and also describes ASCONF chunk processing when Dynamic Address
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| Reconfiguration is enabled.
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| 
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| 
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| security_sctp_sk_clone()
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| -------------------------
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| Called whenever a new socket is created by **accept**\(2) (i.e. a TCP style
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| socket) or when a socket is 'peeled off' e.g userspace calls
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| **sctp_peeloff**\(3). ``security_sctp_sk_clone()`` will set the new
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| sockets sid and peer sid to that contained in the ``@ep sid`` and
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| ``@ep peer sid`` respectively.
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| ::
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| 
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|     @ep - pointer to current sctp endpoint structure.
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|     @sk - pointer to current sock structure.
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|     @sk - pointer to new sock structure.
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| 
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| 
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| security_inet_conn_established()
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| ---------------------------------
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| Called when a COOKIE ACK is received where it sets the connection's peer sid
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| to that in ``@skb``::
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| 
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|     @sk  - pointer to sock structure.
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|     @skb - pointer to skbuff of the COOKIE ACK packet.
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| 
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| 
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| Policy Statements
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| ==================
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| The following class and permissions to support SCTP are available within the
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| kernel::
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| 
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|     class sctp_socket inherits socket { node_bind }
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| 
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| whenever the following policy capability is enabled::
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| 
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|     policycap extended_socket_class;
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| 
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| SELinux SCTP support adds the ``name_connect`` permission for connecting
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| to a specific port type and the ``association`` permission that is explained
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| in the section below.
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| 
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| If userspace tools have been updated, SCTP will support the ``portcon``
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| statement as shown in the following example::
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| 
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|     portcon sctp 1024-1036 system_u:object_r:sctp_ports_t:s0
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| 
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| 
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| SCTP Peer Labeling
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| ===================
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| An SCTP socket will only have one peer label assigned to it. This will be
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| assigned during the establishment of the first association. Any further
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| associations on this socket will have their packet peer label compared to
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| the sockets peer label, and only if they are different will the
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| ``association`` permission be validated. This is validated by checking the
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| socket peer sid against the received packets peer sid to determine whether
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| the association should be allowed or denied.
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| 
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| NOTES:
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|    1) If peer labeling is not enabled, then the peer context will always be
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|       ``SECINITSID_UNLABELED`` (``unlabeled_t`` in Reference Policy).
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| 
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|    2) As SCTP can support more than one transport address per endpoint
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|       (multi-homing) on a single socket, it is possible to configure policy
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|       and NetLabel to provide different peer labels for each of these. As the
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|       socket peer label is determined by the first associations transport
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|       address, it is recommended that all peer labels are consistent.
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| 
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|    3) **getpeercon**\(3) may be used by userspace to retrieve the sockets peer
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|       context.
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| 
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|    4) While not SCTP specific, be aware when using NetLabel that if a label
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|       is assigned to a specific interface, and that interface 'goes down',
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|       then the NetLabel service will remove the entry. Therefore ensure that
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|       the network startup scripts call **netlabelctl**\(8) to set the required
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|       label (see **netlabel-config**\(8) helper script for details).
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| 
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|    5) The NetLabel SCTP peer labeling rules apply as discussed in the following
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|       set of posts tagged "netlabel" at: http://www.paul-moore.com/blog/t.
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| 
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|    6) CIPSO is only supported for IPv4 addressing: ``socket(AF_INET, ...)``
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|       CALIPSO is only supported for IPv6 addressing: ``socket(AF_INET6, ...)``
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| 
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|       Note the following when testing CIPSO/CALIPSO:
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|          a) CIPSO will send an ICMP packet if an SCTP packet cannot be
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|             delivered because of an invalid label.
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|          b) CALIPSO does not send an ICMP packet, just silently discards it.
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| 
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|    7) IPSEC is not supported as RFC 3554 - sctp/ipsec support has not been
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|       implemented in userspace (**racoon**\(8) or **ipsec_pluto**\(8)),
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|       although the kernel supports SCTP/IPSEC.
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